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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Income inequality is rising in Germany. This is true for both functional as well as 
personal income distribution. After reunification in 1990, a general increase in inequality can 
be observed. This trend becomes particularly pronounced in the 2000s. In the literature on 
financialisation a link between the developments in the financial sector, the financing 
behaviour of firms, and income distribution is established. Also, in the varieties of capitalism 
literature a connection between the prevailing institutions, among them the financial 
institutions, and the tendency of an economy towards higher or lower inequality is made. This 
study attempts to investigate if changes in the financial sphere may have caused the higher 
inequality in Germany. There are different ways in which the financial sector could have 
contributed to the increased inequality. Growth of the financial sector or large increases in 
incomes paid in this sector could lead to higher inequality directly. Alternatively, different 
behaviour of financial institutions and new financial actors could affect distribution in the 
non-financial sector so that the financial sector indirectly affects inequality.  
In this study, both channels will be examined. For the reader not accustomed to the 
German case, first, an overview about the general trends in inequality is given and, then, 
main features of the structure and the relevant developments of the German financial 
system are outlined. Following this, employment and incomes in the financial sector are 
examined to verify whether it directly has contributed to the observed increases in 
inequality. Thereafter, it looks at the links between the financial sector and non-financial 
corporations. Here the influence of the financial system on the corporate governance 
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system in Germany and the distributional consequences of these changes are examined. 
In the last section, the main results are summarised and some general conclusions are 
drawn.
1
 
 
2.  TRENDS IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN GERMANY
2
 
Looking at the adjusted wage share
3
 in Figure 1, one can observe a downward 
trend starting in 1980. The wage share fell from 71 percent in 1980 to 65 percent in 1990. 
It recovered in the early 1990s with reunification, due to a higher wage share in East 
Germany. A slow decline resumed in 1994. This decline became more pronounced after 
2000 and the wage share fell to 61 percent in 2007. It recovered with the outbreak of the 
financial crisis and stood at 65 percent in 2012. Krämer (2011) looked at the labour share 
of income
4
 and found similar developments. The labour income share fluctuated around 
80 percent in the 1990s and then collapsed after 2000 to only 72.3 percent in 2007. When 
he looked more closely at the components that caused the change between 1999 and 2010 
he found that the relatively low distribution margin
5
 of on average 0.73 percent in this 
period was only, to a very minor degree, used for the increase of the real wages (0.13 
percent on average).  
 
Fig. 1.  Adjusted Wage Share, Germany, 1960 – 2012 (% of GDP) 
 
Source: European Commission (2013). 
 
1Due to space limitation there will be no detailed theoretical discussion of the links between inequality 
and financialisation, but only short remarks of those links within the analysis. For a theoretical discussion of 
those links see Hein and Detzer (2014). A more general discussion of financialisation in Germany can be found 
in Detzer and Hein (2014). 
2For a more extensive analysis of the changes in income distribution in Germany see Hein and Detzer 
(2014). 
3The wage share is the ratio of compensation of employees and GDP. Here it is adjusted, so that it does 
not reflect the changes in composition of employment (employees and self-employed), but only the changes in 
relative income. 
4The labour share of income adds to the wage share an estimated wage for self-employed persons. 
5Relates to the change in productivity per worker. If it is fully used for real wage increase, functional 
income distribution would not change.  
56
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
72
74
Germany West Germany
 Inequality and the Financial System  587 
 
Also, personal income distribution has become more unequal. The Gini 
Coefficient for market incomes in Germany increased from 0.429 in 1990 to 0.471 in 
2000. From 2000 to 2004 it increased further to 0.499. By 2010 it had decreased a little to 
0.492. Further, if one looks at the distribution of disposable income (after redistribution 
through taxes and transfers), one can see a remarkable increase of inequality, which 
largely occurred during the 2000s. In the period from 1990 to 2000, the Gini Coefficient 
increased from 0.256 to 0.264. From 2000 to 2010, it increased to 0.286 [OECD (2013)].  
Overall, income inequality in Germany has increased. Functional income 
distribution has changed in favour of profits at the expense of wages. At the same time, 
personal income distribution has become more unequal. The general trend could be 
observed already during the 1990s but the strongest increase of inequality was observed 
after 2000. In the following I will look at the changes in the financial system that 
occurred since the 1980s and investigate of whether the changes in income inequality can 
be related to changes in the financial system.  
 
3.  THE GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AN OVERVIEW 
The German financial system has been classified as a prime example of a bank-
based financial system. Despite attempts in the 1990s to promote security markets and 
certain regulatory changes conducive to their development, banks are still the main actors 
in Germany‘s financial system. Detzer, et al. (2013) showed that the main quantitative 
indicators still point to a bank-based financial system. Ratios of balance sheet size, bank 
deposits or bank loans to GDP are still much higher in Germany than, for example, in the 
USA, which is classified as a typical market-based financial system. At the same time 
financial markets are less developed in Germany. Stock-market capitalisation and trading 
activity are low compared to countries with market-based financial systems; domestic 
markets for private debt securities are also less developed. 
 
3.1.  The German Banking Sector 
In contrast to most other developed capitalist countries a large part of the German 
banking system consists of publicly-owned and cooperative banks. The German banking 
act puts no restriction on the conduct of investment and commercial banking. Therefore, 
most German banks are principally universal banks.  
In 2012, private banks held 38 percent of the banking sector‘s assets, publicly-
owned banks held 29.4 percent and the cooperative banks 11.8 percent. Additionally, 
there are some special purpose banks that are largely related to the financing of real 
estate, which account for 20.4 percent of total assets (Table 1).  
The largest four banks among the private banks already account for 25.3 percent of 
total banks‘ assets. Those are Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank and Unicredit. The fourth 
private big bank is Postbank. However, Deutsche Bank holds 93.7 percent of its shares, 
so that it cannot really be regarded as a separate institution. These big banks have 
traditionally acted as house banks to the German large industrial firms. Banks and 
industrial firms were connected through cross-shareholdings and supervisory board seats. 
However, the need for external finance from these firms has declined since the 1970s. 
After attempts to enter the business with small and medium sized enterprises remained 
unsuccessful because savings and cooperative banks dominated this market, the big banks  
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Table 1 
Banks by Banking Group, Germany, 1980 – 2012 
  1980 2000 2007 2012 
 Number % assets Number % assets Number % assets Number % assets 
Total 3,359 100.0 2,987 100.0 2,038 100.0 1,988 100.0 
Private banks 162 23.5 290 27.1 254 29.4 284 38.3 
   Big banks 6 9.8 4 15.4 5 18.6 4 25.3 
   Regional banks 100 10.5 199 9.8 157 8.9 168 9.4 
Branches of foreign banks 56 1.7 87 2.0 92 2.0 110 3.6 
Savings bank sector 611 38.6 580 35.3 461 33.9 436 29.4 
   Landesbanken 12 16.5 13 19.8 12 20.2 10 16.7 
   Primary savings banks 599 22.1 567 15.5 449 13.7 426 12.7 
Cooperative sector 2,304 14.8 2,039 12.5 1,259 11.7 1,123 11.8 
   Regional institutions 10 4.0 4 3.6 2 3.4 2 3.4 
   Primary cooperative banks 2,294 10.7 2,035 8.8 1,257 8.3 1,121 8.4 
Special banks         
   Mortgage banks 39 13.6 32 14.6 22 11.5 18 6.9 
   Building and loan  
   associations 
 0.0 32 2.5 26 2.6 23 
2.3 
   Special purpose banks 17 6.4 14 7.9 16 10.9 17 11.2 
Memo item         
    Foreign banks   148 4.1 138 11.4 150 12.1 
   of which majority owned 
foreign banks 
  61 2.1 46 9.4 40 
8.5 
Source:  Detzer, et al. (2013), p. 75. 
 
focused on investment banking activities instead. To increase business in this area, they 
were also the main proponents of the development of securities markets in Germany. At 
the same time their strong links with industrial firms made their neutrality in investment 
banking activities questionable and, therefore, they started to reduce their shareholdings 
as well as their supervisory seats in non-financial firms [Deeg (2002)].  
The savings bank sector consists of primary savings banks, the regional 
Landesbanken and the Deka Bank. The savings banks are usually owned by the local city 
or county governments. Each savings bank is independent and managed locally. Its 
business activities are restricted to customers within its locality and actively trying to 
expand business to customers in other areas is prohibited. The main distinct feature of 
savings banks is that their main purpose is not profit making. Instead, they are required to 
serve the public interest of their local community. The usage of occurring profits is 
regulated differently and depends on their statute. Savings banks put most of their profits 
into reserves, distribute them to the respective public owner or use them directly to 
finance charitable and public projects. According to Deeg (2002) they focused on the 
provision of low-cost, long-term financing and use this to compete with other banking 
groups. This would pressure other banking groups to also provide long-term financing. 
Additionally, the institutional structure provides incentives to the savings banks (the same 
is true for the cooperative banks) to provide long-term funding to the local non-financial 
sector. Due to   being restricted to respective local markets, they have to be interested in 
the long-term viability of their local clients. Also, they have strong incentives not to harm 
their reputation as long-term they have reliable partnership  with their clients. Despite 
their not-profit maximising behaviour, their engagement to support the local economy 
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and community and possible influences due to their state ownership, they seem not less 
competitive than their private counterparts. Their ability to maintain their market share in 
commercial lending appears to confirm this. Also, regarding profitability or efficiency 
savings banks do not seem to be inferior to private banks.
6
 
On a second level in the savings bank sector there are the regional Landesbanken. 
Their original purpose was to function as a banker to regional state governments and as a 
central bank to the savings banks in their region. Additionally, they developed a wide 
range of commercial and investment banking activities, through which they compete 
directly with the big private banks. During the financial crisis in 2008, the Landesbanken 
were criticised because they registered large losses due to their trading activities in 
complex financial instruments.  
A third level of the savings bank sector is made up by the Deka Bank, which 
serves as the central asset manager of the savings bank group. 
Within the group many functions have been centralised so that the local savings 
banks can profit from the economies of scale of a big bank, without giving up their local 
focus.  
The cooperative banking sector consists of the primary cooperative banks that act 
on a local level and two regional institutions. The primary cooperative banks are also 
limited to local markets and focus mainly on traditional bank lending instead of 
investment banking activities. They are owned by their members and are, like the savings 
banks, not strictly profit maximising. Instead they are required to serve the interests of 
their members. The two regional institutions act as central banks for the primary 
cooperative banks. They also compete with the big private banks and the Landesbanken 
for commercial and investment banking business [Detzer, et al. (2013)].  
 
3.2.  Securities Markets 
As mentioned above, securities markets in Germany are relatively undeveloped. 
Bank loans are the main source of external finance for non-financial firms, while shares 
and bonds play only a negligible role. German domestic bond markets have mainly been 
used by banks to raise additional finance but recently other financial institutions take part 
as well. The stock markets are also relatively undeveloped. Trading value, stock market 
capitalisation and turnover ratios did increase with the stock market boom at the end of 
the 1990s. However, figures are still low compared to the US or the UK.  
German private investors mostly hold their financial savings in the form of bank 
deposits and insurance policies. The proportion of savings held directly in the form of 
shares and bonds is relatively low and confined to few individuals [Detzer, et al. (2013)]. 
At the same time foreign investors were not particularly present in the German market 
partly due to the regulatory framework, which was opaque for outsiders. Stock markets 
were largely self-regulated and rules regarding insider trading were lax. The lack of 
attractive product innovations and relatively high trading fees were two additional 
reasons that explain the reservations of foreign investors towards the German financial 
markets. According to Lütz (2002) this system was beneficial for the big German banks 
but at the same time depended also on their support. Simultaneously, the Bundesbank 
 
6 For an overview regarding research on profitability and efficiency see Detzer, et al. (2013), Chapters 
8 and 9. 
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played a moderating role regarding the spread of new financial instruments and actors in 
Germany, mainly because of concerns about the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
The modernisation and regulative reconstruction of the German system of 
financial markets occurred mainly during the 1990s and therefore much later than in the 
US or the UK. As mentioned above, banks lost their interest in maintaining the existing 
system due to their strategic reorientation. They started to establish their investment 
banking activities mainly through acquisitions of existing international investment banks. 
At the same time, they pushed their idea of establishing Germany as an international 
financial centre. In 2003, one of their main platforms for this purpose was founded—the 
initiative ―Finanzstandort Deutschland‖ (Germany as a financial centre). It was closely 
linked to political actors, since the German Ministry of Finance and the Deutsche 
Bundesbank were also members of this platform. The initiative was closed in 2011 during 
the financial crisis.
7
 
Starting in 1984, first the Bundesbank and later the government passed a variety of 
deregulatory measures, which abolished hurdles for foreign engagements (e.g. certain tax 
laws) and allowed more financial innovations [Domanski (2003)]. 
The First Financial Market Promotion Act (ErstesFinanzmarktförderungsgesetz) in 
1990, introduced a range of legislative steps to modernise the financial market structure to 
become more similar to the US and UK markets. The core part established with this act was 
the Prospectus Act (Verkaufsprospektgesetz),which governed the requirements for the 
prospectus for securities offered for the first time to the public. It was the first legislative act 
whose primary goal was to protect investors in German capital markets. 
The Second Financial Market Promotion Act (ZweitesFinanzmarkt förderungsgesetz), 
which came into effect in 1995, had far reaching securities trading provisions. One of its 
main issues was the regulation of insider trading and ad-hoc news announcements. But it 
also established a federal agency (Bundesaufsichtsamtfür den Wertpapierhandel) 
responsible for the regulation of securities markets, which was similar to the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission.  
The Third Financial Market Promotion Act (DrittesFinanzmarktförderungsgesetz), 
including the Control and Transparency in Business Law (GesetzzurKontrolle und 
TransparenzimUnternehmensbereich) was passed in 1998. The law affected the activities 
of corporations and stock exchanges and influenced accounting practices. It is interesting 
to note that the Ministry of Finance in its press release explicitly related the law towards 
the promotion of shareholder value policies. Some of the most important changes in the 
law regarded the use of proxy voting by banks, the enabling of stock option programs and 
of share buybacks, the disclosure of inter-corporate share ownership, limitations on 
serving on multiple boards and the use of voting caps.  
In 2001, this was followed by the Tax Reduction Act (Steuersenkungsgesetz), 
which eliminated corporate capital gains taxes. This removed an important barrier to the 
reduction of inter-corporate cross-shareholdings.  
The last most relevant change was the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act 
(Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz) in 2002, which formally regulated merger 
and acquisitions and severely limited the defence measures a firm, targeted by a hostile 
takeover attempt, could take [Bradley and Sundaram (2003)].  
 
7 ―Banken dampfen Lobbyarbeit ein‖, Handelsblatt Online, 28.06.2011.  
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Following legislative steps, including the Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act 
(ViertesFinanzmarktförderungsgesetz), did enlarge the investment opportunities for 
institutional investors and allowed new financial investors, like hedge funds and others, 
to become active in Germany in 2004. 
Those legal changes made the German market more transparent and more 
accessible for foreign investors, as it allowed for more outsider control. At the same time 
they unravelled the German corporate network and facilitated the establishment of a 
market for corporate control.  
A range of privatisations of former state owned corporations gave an important 
impetus to the growth of stock markets in Germany during the 1990s. In the course of the 
new technology boom at the end of the 1990s, Germany‘s stock markets boomed and 
many German households started to invest in shares for the first time. The establishment 
of a shareholder culture in Germany seemed successful. However, with the collapse of 
stock prices and the closure of some market segments established during the boom, 
German households retreated again from the stock-market and the new equity culture 
seemed to have been a rather short-lived fancy [Detzer, et al. (2003)]. 
 
3.3.  Employment and Incomes in the Financial Sector and Their  
Contribution to Inequality 
In some countries, such as the UK or the US, the size of the financial sector in the 
economy has grown significantly. This is true in terms of value added as well as for the 
number of people employed. The OECD (2012) remarks that a higher share of the 
financial intermediation sector in total employment contributes to higher labour income 
inequality, since the gains from working in this sector are greater for high income 
workers. Additionally, some studies found that the strong rise in incomes in the financial 
sector had contributed much to increase inequality in many countries. Here, the rising 
incomes of the very top earners in this sector were the driving factor. 
 
Incomes in the Financial Sector 
Figure 2 shows the compensation of employees in percent of net value added in 
different sectors of the German economy. It clearly shows that since around 2000 there 
was an upward shift in the compensation of employees in the financial corporate sector. 
At the same time, the share exhibits much larger fluctuations than in the period before. 
The upward shift of the wage share in the financial sector should have positively affected 
the overall wage share in Germany. Thus, the reasons for its downward trend should be 
found in the non-financial corporate sector, where the share going to labour decreased 
between 1993 and 2007. The downward trend in the non-financial corporate sector was 
partly balanced by an increasing share going to employees in the household sector in the 
period between 1997 and 2003, although, after this also in the household sector the share 
going to employees decreased until 2008.  
Looking at the net value added of financial corporations in total value added  
Figure 3 shows that the share was relatively stable until 1999. After, it exhibits much 
larger fluctuations and shows a slight downward trend. Therefore, Germany does not 
follow the international trend of an increasing importance of the financial sector in the 
economy. Given the slightly higher wage share in the financial sector as compared to the 
592 Daniel Detzer 
rest of the economy, its relative loss in net value added in Germany could contribute to 
the explanation of the declining total wage share. However, given the financial sectors‘ 
relatively small overall share in total net value added and the relatively small difference 
between the wage share in the financial sector and in Germany as a whole, the 
explanatory power is rather low.  
 
Fig. 2.  Compensation of Employees by Sector, Germany, 1991 – 2012  
(% of Net Value Added) 
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
Total Non-financial corporations Financial corporations
Government Households
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2013). 
 
Fig. 3.  Net Value Added of Financial Corporations, Germany, 1991 – 2012  
(% of Total Net Value Added) 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2013). 
 
Incomes and Employment in the Financial Sector 
In many countries increases in personal income inequality and in particular wage 
inequality were partially related to the large wage increases in the financial sector as compared 
to the rest of the economy [e.g. Rosnick and Baker (2012) for a cross sample of OECD 
countries; Bell and Van Reenen (2010) for the UK; Godechot (2011) for France]. In the US, 
for example, the share of total compensation going to employees in the financial sector 
increased from 4.5 percent in 1980 to 7.7 percent in 2006, while the financial sectors 
contribution to total employment fluctuated around 5 percent during the same period 
[Orhangazi (2008)]. 
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In Germany, hourly compensation and compensation per employee are higher in 
the financial sector (Figure 4). In 1992, the average hourly wage in the financial sector 
was about 1.45 times that in the economy as a whole. In 2000, the ratio had not changed 
much and was at 1.46. From then on, the hourly wages in the financial sector increased 
faster than in the rest of the economy, so that in 2007 an employee in the financial sector 
earned on average almost 1.6 times the average hourly wage. On a per employee basis the 
general trend is similar, but at a higher level. As a result, financial sector employees 
improved their position relative to other employees. With the financial sector wages 
already at a higher level, this has contributed to higher wage inequality as well as to 
higher inequality in personal income distribution.  
 
Fig. 4.  Compensation of Employees in the Financial Sector Compared  
to the Rest of the Economy, Germany, 1991–2012 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2013). 
 
However, the increases in the average financial sector pay were not extraordinary 
large. Hourly wages in the financial sector grew at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent 
in the period 1991 to 1999 (Table 2). Excluding the exceptionally strong year 1991 
hourly wages grew in line with the average wage and GDP growth in this period. 
Between 2000 and 2007 the average growth of wages in the financial sector was 2.6 
percent. This was above average but still in line with GDP growth and conformed to 
target inflation plus the distribution margin (productivity growth) of 0.73 percent 
calculated by Krämer (2011) for this period. However, the average wage growth in 
Germany fell to 1.3 percent during the same period. The increasing income dispersion 
therefore, does rather seem to be related to the sluggish wage growth in the rest of the 
economy. The opposite was true after the crisis. Financial sector compensation grew 
slower, while in all other sectors wage growth picked up.  
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Table 2 
Average Annual Growth Rates of Nominal Hourly Wages in  
Different Sectors, Germany, 1991–2012 
 1991-2012 1991 - 2000 2000 – 2012 2000 - 2007 2007 - 2012 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1,6% 3,0% 0,5% -0,7% 2,1% 
Industry, excluding construction 3,2% 4,5% 2,1% 1,9% 2,4% 
Manufacturing 3,2% 4,6% 2,2% 2,0% 2,4% 
Construction 2,2% 3,0% 1,6% 1,1% 2,3% 
Trade, transport, accommodation 
and food services 2,3% 3,4% 1,5% 1,3% 1,9% 
Information and communication 3,3% 4,9% 2,1% 1,8% 2,5% 
Financial and insurance sevices 3,1% 4,2% 2,2% 2,6% 1,7% 
Real estate activities 2,4% 3,8% 1,3% 0,4% 2,6% 
Business services 2,4% 3,3% 1,7% 0,7% 3,1% 
Public services, education, health 2,4% 3,3% 1,8% 1,1% 2,8% 
Other services 2,3% 3,5% 1,5% 0,3% 3,1% 
Total 2,6% 3,6% 1,7% 1,3% 2,4% 
Nominal GDP growth 2,6% 3,3% 2,2% 2,5% 1,7% 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2013). 
 
In Germany, the share of total compensation paid to employees in the financial 
sector slightly increased from just under 4.9 percent in 1991 to 5.4 percent in 2002 
(Figure 5). After, a downward trend can be observed and by 2012 the share was at 4.8 
percent. Looking at the financial sector‘s contribution to employment the graph clearly 
shows a downward trend starting in 1994, while the share of total hours worked in the 
financial sector stayed roughly stable. This means relatively fewer employees worked 
relatively more hours, so that total compensation was split among fewer workers. Only 
from 2002 on, the share of hours worked in the financial sector also declined. In general 
the working hours per employee in the financial sector are between 4 and 12 percent 
higher than average working hours per employee in the rest of the economy.  
 
Fig. 5.  Working Volume and Employee Compensation in the Financial Sector  
Compared to the Rest of the Economy, Germany, 1991–2012 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2013). 
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Two conclusions can be drawn: Overall, employment in the financial sector and 
compensation of employees in this sector  are relatively low as compared to the US. Also, 
an extraordinary growth of the financial sector or the compensations in that sector could 
not be observed. The higher average compensation on a per employee basis may have 
contributed to inequality in Germany; however, regarding the overall importance of the 
sector and the magnitude of the changes, it can only explain a small part of the observed 
increases in inequality.  
Looking at the average figures alone shows only part of the picture. If wage 
dispersion has increased in the financial sector, so that top earners increased their incomes 
while lower level workers‘ wages decreased or stagnated, this would have contributed to 
inequality. Especially for the US, the OECD reports that the amount of top earners that 
come from the financial profession has increased rapidly [OECD (2011)]. One extreme 
example are the incomes of the top 25 hedge fund managers. In 2001, they earned a 
cumulative 5 billion USD and this grew to well over 25 billion USD in 2009 [Fichtner 
(2013)]. If a similar trend is apparent in Germany, it would contribute to inequality. 
The payments to management boards in the top-listed German companies provide 
a first idea of the prevailing trends. The compensation for members of the management 
boards of big German companies listed in the DAX30 (the German index for blue chip 
companies) grew moderately until 1995 (5 percent per year), but then compensation 
started to increase strongly until 2007 with an average annual growth rate of 15 percent 
(Figure 6). Thereafter, average compensation fell until 2009. Therefore, top management 
compensation followed the international trends and increased strongly, even though it has 
not reached levels comparable to the US, where the average annual pay in 2010 was close 
to 10 million Euros [DSW (2011)].  The financial sector data for Germany in Table 3 
shows that Deutsche Bank in particular paid very high compensation.
8
  Allianz also paid 
above average compensation, while Commerzbank and Munich Re paid compensations 
below average. Despite the fact that the picture might be affected by the crisis, it does not 
seem that the financial sector has generally higher management compensation than the 
non-financial sector, but that it rather followed the overall trend.  
 
Fig. 6.  Average Management Board Member Compensation Per Head for  
Corporations Listed on the DAX 30, Germany, 1987–2010 
 
Source: Schwalbach (2012). 
 
8Chairman of the Deutsche Bank Josef Ackermann was the highest paid Dax chairman with almost 14 
million Euro in 2007. 
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Table 3 
Average Management Board Pay Per Member for Financial Institutions  
Listed in the DAX30, Germany, 2007 – 2010, in 1,000 € 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 
DAX30 average              2,964                  2,576                 2,371                 2,738    
Munich Re              1,704                  2,310                 1,974                 1,295    
Deutsche Bank              6,636                     895                 4,872                 4,153    
Commerzbank              1,956                  1,109                   534                   527    
Allianz              3,529                  2,388                 2,572                 3,783    
Source: Schwalbach (2012). 
 
To conclude, while the strong increase in payments to top management surely has 
increased inequality, this trend does not seem to be confined uniquely to the financial 
sector. Instead, it seems to be an overall trend in large German corporations. The 
tendencies in top management compensation however, are in line with a turn towards 
shareholder value in German companies, which we will discuss below. 
 
4.  RELATION BETWEEN THE FINANCIAL AND THE  
NON-FINANCIAL SECTOR 
While the concept of stakeholder value prevailed in German management boards for a 
long time, a trend to give higher priority to profitability and to shareholder value was apparent 
in the past decades. This should not only lead to changes in the functional income distribution 
in favour of profits, but with very unequally distributed wealth in Germany (the richest 10 
percent households own 59 percent of total net-wealth (47 percent for the Euro Area w/o 
Germany)), also to increases in personal income inequality.  
There are different hypothesis about, why German non-financial corporations have 
adopted shareholder value strategies. Höpner (2003) identified four main arguments. For 
Germany the most relevant ones that are related to the financial sector are the following 
ones. First, owners of German firms have become more profit oriented so that those 
investors pressure management for shareholder friendly policies. Second, the institutional 
framework in Germany has changed allowing a market for corporate control to emerge, 
which forces managers to adopt shareholder-value policies. The following section will 
examine those hypotheses for the case of Germany.  
 
4.1.  Shareholder Value Orientation Due to the Pressure by Institutional Investors 
Höpner (2003) argued that the capital market orientation of firms depends on their 
ownership structure and that the share of institutional investors in the ownership structure 
is positively correlated with shareholder value orientation. He found that private 
households have delegated their direct shareholdings to institutional investors during the 
1990. Additionally, during the 1990s more foreign institutional investors, in particular US 
investment funds, have also invested in German companies. Those institutional investors 
became influential shareholders of firms and passed their performance pressure on to the 
management of the non-financial firms so that those were pressured to follow a strategy 
of shareholder value und profit maximisation.  
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Data on shareholdings of different groups of investors for the period 1991 to 2012 
confirms those tendencies in ownership structure (Table 4). The share of domestic 
investment firms and financial institutions increased in particular until 2000. The data 
also confirms the increasing importance of owners from the rest of the world. 
Unfortunately, the flow of funds accounts do not distinguish where the foreign holders of 
German stocks come from. However, Beckmann (2007) noted that a large part of foreign 
shareholders in 2002 were institutional investors from Britain and the US. Additional 
evidence for large shareholdings of US investors was delivered by a report from 
Kleinwort (2007), which claimed that the share of US-investors increased from 3 percent 
to 18 percent of total shares between 1998 and 2006. Hence, it can be confirmed that 
institutional investors as owners of German joint stock corporations have become more 
important.  
It can be argued that some investors have strategic and not only financial interests 
in their stock holdings. This leaves managers room for other strategies than profit 
maximisation. If the share of purely financially interested shareholders increases, this 
room should be tightened. Assuming that the groups of the rest of the world, investment 
firms and other financial institutions, and private households largely hold their shares to 
gain financial returns, while all other groups also have strategic interests, one can see that 
between 1991 and 2007 investors with a financial interest have become more dominant 
(Table 4).  Additionally, if one distinguishes the group of financial investors into 
institutional and private investors, one can see that the share of private direct 
shareholdings has decreased. This is important, because the investment behaviours and 
strategies of private investors normally leave the management more room for manoeuvre 
than  those of professional investors [Höpner (2003)]. 
 
Table 4 
Ownership of Domestic Joint Stock Corporations, Germany, 1991–2012 
 (% of Total Shares at Market Value Outstanding) 
 1991 1995 2000 2005 2007 2012 
Non-financialcorporations 42.7% 43.7% 32.2% 35.5% 30.5% 36.4% 
Banks 11.2% 11.3% 12.2% 9.0% 4.9% 4.2% 
Investment firms and other financial Institutions 3.8% 5.9% 12.2% 12.3% 12.5% 10.3% 
Insurance firms 4.8% 5.7% 4.4% 4.6% 5.0% 7.3% 
Government 5.2% 5.7% 3.1% 2.8% 1.8% 2.1% 
Private households 19.5% 18.6% 15.8% 13.9% 11.6% 10.3% 
Rest of the world 12.8% 9.1% 20.1% 21.9% 33.7% 29.3% 
Strategic investors 64.0% 66.4% 51.9% 51.9% 42.2% 50.1% 
Financial investors 36.0% 33.6% 48.1% 48.1% 57.8% 49.9% 
Institutional 16.6% 14.9% 32.3% 34.2% 46.2% 39.6% 
Private 19.5% 18.6% 15.8% 13.9% 11.6% 10.3% 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2013), own calculation. 
Notes: For the calculation of the figures it had to be assumed that all domestic sectors hold an equal share of 
stocks in foreign companies in their portfolios. It is assumed that non-financial corporations, banks, 
insurance firms and the government have strategic interests in their holdings, while private households, 
investment firms and other financial institutions and investors from the rest of the world are only 
pursuing financial interests. In particular the banks and insurance companies seem to have become more 
of financial than strategic investors over the period [Höpner and Krempel (2006)], so that they could be 
counted also towards financial investors.  
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Fichtner (2009) looked at similar figures and also confirmed that the number of 
strategic investors has declined. Additionally, he looked at the number of blockholders, 
which can shield company managers from market demands (and from hostile takeovers), 
in large German companies   those have declined. In 1991, 85 percent of the firms had a 
shareholder with a block above 25 percent. This number had fallen to 56 percent by 2008.  
The remaining question in this regards is how institutional investors are able to 
influence the management to pursue a shareholder oriented strategy. In the US, meetings 
of larger investors and management are not unusual and investors try to directly influence 
management boards. Studies on investor behaviour from 1998 and 2000 show, however, 
that direct influence on managements was rather rare in Germany. Therefore, the main 
channel seemed to have been the threat of selling shares which would correspond to a  
decline in share prices.  
However, this seemed to have changed in the course of the 2000s. More recent 
surveys show that managers of big German companies conform to the demands of US-
investors for more meetings, transparency and regular communication. Additionally, 
German managers predicted in 2007 that the most important investors over the next five 
years will be located in the US or the UK and not in Germany or Europe [Kleinwort 
(2007)]. That can be a reason for them to pursue management strategies that are more 
common in those countries. The general hypothesis that the composition of owners is 
relevant for the corporate strategy is confirmed by a survey conducted by Achtleiter and 
Bassen (2000), which investigated the reasons for the increased shareholder-value 
orientation in Germany. The main reason given was the increased focus on returns by 
shareholders. Therefore, there is evidence for the fact that increased financial interests of 
shareholders have influenced management to follow strategies more in line with the 
shareholder value concept.  
The pressure from institutional investors seemed to have reached a new qualitative 
stage due to the intensified activities of so-called activist hedge funds. They buy 
substantial stakes in companies and then publicly pressure them to follow certain 
demands to increase (short term) shareholder value.
9
 The usual demands are: share buy-
back programmes, special dividends, either from surplus cash or even by taking on 
additional debt, and the sale of divisions that are not part of the core business area of the 
company. They substantially influence long-term management decisions and very often 
profit from an asset transfer from other stakeholders, such as workers, suppliers or 
creditors, to shareholders. Empirical studies, mainly for the US, show that the 
involvement of an activist hedge fund in a firm led to higher stock returns, but also that 
the average targetted firm of an activist hedge fund has significantly increased its long 
term debt load, while doubling dividends and decreasing its short term investment and its 
cash position [Fichtner (2009)]. For Germany, Bessler, et al. (2008) showed that short 
 
9One prominent example was the investment of the hedge fund manager David Einhorn (Greenlight 
Capital) in Apple. In TV and press he publicly criticized Apple for holding too much cash and that they should 
pay out part of it to investors. The high involvement in the firm‘s policies can also be seen by the fact that they 
filled a suit against some changes in Apple‘s bylaw [Handelsblatt (2013)]. Eventually, Apple gave in and issued 
debt to start a stock-repurchase programme and to increase its dividend in April 2013 [Bloomberg (2013)]. 
Apple is currently again confronted with similar claims by the activist investor Carl Icahn, which, despite 
having a share of below once percent actively tries to influence the firms policies [Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (2013)].  
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and long term shareholder value increased by firms targeted by activist hedge funds. 
Fichtner (2009) used a qualitative approach to look at the impact of activist hedge funds 
in Germany. He examined the ten most prominent cases of hedge fund involvement in 
Germany. He found that companies in which strategic block holders owned the largest 
holdings of shares, the demands from hedge funds could very often be averted. If 
however, the hedge funds had a larger share, their demands were usually fulfilled. 
Therefore, the observed decline of large strategic investors increased the threat of being 
targeted by activist hedge funds. Fichtner (2009) pointed out, that the activism of hedge 
funds in Germany, the ability to act in concert (wolf-pack tactics) and the reputation they 
built up in high-publicity cases [e.g. Deutsche Börse in (2005)]  have enabled them to 
establish ―a tightly knit grid of material coercion‖ for German listed companies that are 
not protected by a large strategic stakeholder. This ―disciplinary power‖ forces 
unprotected corporations, even though they are not currently targeted by an activist hedge 
fund to pursue shareholder value enhancing strategies, such as share buy-backs and 
increased dividends.
10
 
While activist hedge funds mostly invest in listed stock corporations, similar 
pressure is exerted by private equity funds
11
 on non-listed companies. Private 
equity funds normally invest in a company‘s equity, reorganise the company and 
sell it in the medium term to another investor for a higher price. Supporters of 
private equity (PE in the following) see their activity as a driver for a more 
efficient allocation of capital and higher production efficiency and therefore, as 
beneficial to shareholders, since the value of the firm increases. Additionally, their 
activity leads to less expensive or higher quality goods and also to more jobs 
benefitting society as a whole. Critics argue that PE makes its gains through 
financial engineering at the expense of other stakeholders such as debtors, other 
shareholders and future interests of employees. PE funds increase the debt/equity 
ratio or extract resources through special dividends and the like. Increased 
operational efficiency is achieved by choosing a low road approach, i.e. reducing 
wages, cutting employment, reducing R&D and capital investment. That allows 
them to increase short term profitability at the expense of long run growth and 
innovation. Last but not least, they use tax subsidies for debt relative to equity and 
therefore, part of the gains are achieved by transferring income from tax payers to 
PE investors. Vitols (2008) reviewed international empirical evidence on the 
impact of private equity. His overall assessment stated that there is no evidence of 
a clear gain for either private equity investors or for employment. In particular 
studies for Germany did not show any positive employment o r profitability effect. 
However, case studies for German companies showed that there seemed to be a 
wide range of cases  showing overall positive effects to strong negative effects. 
Additionally, they showed that when a PE firm gets involved in a company, the 
degree to which employee rights for information and consultation are respected 
often deteriorates.  
 
10Alternatively, other firms have started looking for a stable anchor investor that could protect them 
from activist hedge funds.  
11Very often the term private equity refers to funds exerting buyouts and providing venture capital. 
Here it is only referred to funds that perform buyouts.  
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Fig. 7.  Funds under Management by German Private Equity Firms and  
Funds of Foreign Companies Invested in Germany, Germany,  
1991 – 2012 (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Bundesverb and Deutsche Beteiligungsgesellschaften (2013). 
 
Fig. 8. Total Value and Number of Private Equity Deals in Germany, 2004–2012 
 
Source: Ernst and Young (2012). 
 
The empirical evidence for Germany suggests that the negative view prevails. 
Thus, the activities of private equity investors may lead to higher inequality on the one 
hand, by squeezing labour, i.e. lower wages and employment and on the other hand, by 
reducing tax revenues and therefore, trimming down the ability of the state for transfers.  
While private equity funds played a modest role in Germany for a long time, they 
have grown tremendously in size and activity since 1996. Funds under management by 
German private equity firms have grown strongly from 0.25 percent of GDP in 1996 to 
1.6 percent of GDP in 2012 (Figure 7). More importantly, the investment activity of those 
funds in Germany increased strongly as well. While in the first half of 2003 there were 
about 35 transactions with an overall value of about 6 billion Euros [Vitols (2008)], this 
has increased to 78 transactions with a total value of 30 billion Euros in the second half 
of 2006. Thereafter, PE investment decreased strongly with the onset of the financial 
crisis and only has been recovering slowly since 2012 (Figure 8).  Even though there is 
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no direct empirical evidence for the effect of PE on inequality, it is notable that the rise of 
PE firms coincided with the increase in income inequality in Germany.  
 
4.2.  The Occurrence of a Market for Corporate Control 
Another reason also related to ownership structures that lead to the increased 
shareholder value orientation by management is the new pressure occurring through the 
emergence of a German market for corporate control. The argument states that managers 
have an interest to keep share prices high, if a market for corporate control exists. The 
market for corporate control cannot be strictly separated from the stock markets in 
general. It describes the market were investors can acquire control over a firm by gaining 
a majority position in the firm. A company can be listed at the stock market, but does not 
necessarily need to be on the market for corporate control. For example, if a majority 
stake is held by one or more shareholders that are unwilling to sell, or if there are other 
legal or practical barriers that protect the firm against takeovers, corporate control cannot 
be reached. If a market for corporate control exists and if it is relatively active, there are 
two main reasons for managers to pursue a shareholder value strategy to keep the share 
prices high in the secondary markets. First, a high share price protects against hostile 
takeovers. If a company is taken over, there is a risk for the management board to get 
replaced. So the managers have a self interest in avoiding a takeover. Second, if the firm 
thinks about acquiring other firms , a high share price gives them a better position to offer 
a stock swap. Therefore, the existence of a market for corporate control and a firm‘s 
exposure to it gives an incentive to managers to follow shareholder value strategies and 
therefore, has distributional consequences, as as shown by a study of de Jong (1997). He 
showed that companies in Western Europe, where markets for corporate control are less 
active, retain or distribute in the form of wages to workers most of their net-value added, 
while the dividends paid out are below average. In companies in Anglo-Saxon countries, 
where markets for corporate control are more relevant, the relation is reversed—low 
retained earnings and low wages but high dividends. The management seems to solve the 
conflicting targets of long term growth and investors‘ interests differently depending on 
the existence of a market for corporate control.  
For a long time merger and takeover activity in Germany was low compared to 
other European countries. This can be explained by a range of reasons. On the one hand, 
due to cross-shareholdings among industrial firms and the financial sector there were 
only few shares available for trade in the market (low free float), so that hostile takeovers 
were more difficult or even impossible for most companies. On the other hand, the legal 
framework and accounting rules were not conducive to takeovers. At the same time, 
politicians, elites and the general public frowned upon hostile takeovers [Höpner and 
Jackson (2006)]. Nevertheless, merger activities picked up in Germany and the threat of 
takeovers has increased. During the 1970s on average 373 mergers were reported to the 
Federal Cartel Office annually. This already increased to 827 during the 1980s. From 
1991 to 1997, partially due to a large wave of mergers with East German firms and the 
integration and liberalisation of European markets, there were 1,479 deals annually 
valued at about 1.4 percent of GDP. This increased to 1,607 deals and 7.5 percent of GDP 
annually for the period from 1998 to 2005. While this is still below the value and number 
of deals in the UK, the actual threat of being taken over seems similarly high. In 
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Germany between 1998 and 2005, 11 percent of listed companies were targeted in M&A 
transactions, as compared to 9 percent in the UK and 10 percent in the US. This suggests 
that something has changed in Germany that facilitated the occurrence of a market for 
corporate control. Many reasons can be identified. Facilitated by capital market 
orientation of large companies and legal changes on the German national and the EU 
level, more and more firms use International Accounting Standards, which are more 
transparent and favoured by financial investors. This is in general more conducive for 
takeovers. Additionally, in 1995 a voluntary takeover code was established and later the 
Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz, 
WpÜg) was passed in 2002 [Höpner and Jackson (2006)]. It established mandatory bid 
rules, required board neutrality and limited the defensive actions the board can take 
against hostile takeovers [Detzer, et al. (2013)]. Höpner and Jackson (2006) conclude that 
the defensive actions are limited to share buy backs, engaging in alternative acquisitions 
or searching for a white knight. However, the introduction of the takeover act occurred 
when M&A activities had already picked up and therefore, it should be seen as an 
accommodating action of the legislator rather than as a cause of the increased activity.  
Hence, the rise of the market for corporate control has to be related to other 
factors. One factor inhibiting the emergence of a market for corporate control was the 
existence of the so called German Inc. (Deutschland AG). The German business sector 
was characterised by a dense network of cross-shareholdings among firms. The network 
was built around large German financial institutions (Allianz, Commerzbank, Deutsche 
Bank, Dresdner Bank, Hypo-Vereinsbank, Munich Re), which had board seats and large 
holdings in many industrial firms and also between each other. This network was seen as 
a substantial barrier for the market for corporate control. However, with the strategic 
reorientation of the banks towards investment banking during the 1990 they regarded 
their position in industrial firms as a handicap and reduced their engagement. Deutsche 
Bank ,for example, publicly announced that it planned to reduce its board positions and 
share holdings in industrial firms. In the network of cross holdings one can see that most 
of the banks and in particular the Deutsche Bank moved from being in the core to the 
edges of the decisively less dense network between 1996 and 2004. In contrast, the 
Allianz still seems to hold a core position, although it reduced its position overall. 
Nevertheless, Allianz always had a more passive role than the banks. By out sourcing its 
investment portfolio to a separate investment fund Allianz indicated it had a mainly 
financial interest in their investments [Höpner and Krempel (2006)].
12
 The abolition of 
the corporate capital gains tax in 2002 gave a strong impetus to the dissolution of the 
network. It allowed financial institutions to uncover their large hidden reserves without 
paying taxes on the proceeds [Rünger (2012)].  
The dissolution of the cross-shareholding network removed an important barrier to 
the market for corporate control. Apart from their position in the German company 
network, banks had further possibilities to influence the outcomes of takeover attempts. 
Due to their seats on supervisory boards and their ability to exert influence through their 
proxy voting power, they can either support or hamper management in fending off hostile 
 
12Anecdotal evidence of the most of financial interest of Allianz in at least some of its larger stock 
positions is given by Fichtner (2009), who discusses the case of Heidelberger Druck, which came under 
pressure of the activist hedge fund Centaurus to start a share buy-back programme. Allianz remained rather 
passive and sold part of its shares later with a handsome profit.  
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takeover bids. In sum, until the early 1990s at least banks were willing to use their 
powers to undermine hostile takeover attempts. However, the orientation towards 
investment banking led them to be rather supportive of hostile takeovers. The dilemma 
banks faced was well illustrated by the takeovers of Krupp/Hoesch in 1991 and 
Krupp/Thyssen in 1997. In both cases the Deutsche Bank supported the takeover attempts 
by Krupp while it had strong relations to the respective takeover targets. This was widely 
criticised by the public and led the banks to reduce their monitoring role and to direct 
their focus on investment banking mainly [Höpner and Jackson (2006)].  Deutsche Bank 
made its support of a takeover friendly environment in Germany very clear through the 
following quote of its management board chair Klaus Breuer in 1997 during the 
Krupp/Thyssen takeover battle: ―I very much hope that a first large case will set an 
example within our financial culture‖13. Jackson and Höpner (2006) saw the decisive test 
case and proof that a market for corporate control had developed in the 
Mannesmann/Vodafone takeover in Germany. Banks did not play any defensive role for 
Mannesmann. Politicians did not actively intervene in the deal. In sum, the case showed 
that hostile takeovers are possible in Germany.  
As explained above, this development inclines managers to pursue shareholder 
value friendly policies, which in turn leads to a distributional change in favour of 
shareholders and at the expense of workers. While the market for corporate control can 
mainly explain changes in listed stock companies also non-listed and non-stock 
corporations may be affected. As seen above, private equity funds target non-stock 
corporations and therefore, exert a similar pressure on those companies. Additionally, it 
can be argued that many of Germany‘s smaller firms are suppliers of the big industrial 
listed companies. With those under pressure to maximise shareholder value they may use 
their market power to forward this pressure to their suppliers.  
Altogether, we can see there are relevant mechanisms that originated in the 
financial sector and contribute to the spread of shareholder value. German financial 
institutions retreated from the German company network as strategic investors. This left 
room for more financially interested investors, which put pressure on the management to 
follow shareholder value oriented strategies. The increased activity of new forms of 
institutional investors like activist hedge funds and private equity firms took this pressure 
to a new qualitative level. Also, the dissolution of the German company network 
combined with some legal changes, more firms are exposed to the market for corporate 
control. This puts management under additional pressure to keep share prices high in 
order to prevent hostile takeovers. As shown by de Jong (1997) an increase in 
shareholder value has distributional consequences. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
described changes in the financial sector have led to an increased emphasis on promoting 
shareholder value, which in turn has led to increasing inequality. However, how much of 
the increase in inequality can be explained by shareholder value orientation is hard to 
quantify. Looking at the hourly wage developments of different sectors in the economy as 
presented in Table 2 above suggests concluding that it does not seem to be the most 
relevant factor. One can see that average nominal wage growth during the 2000s was 
decisively lower than in the 1990s. This is true for all sectors, and not only the ones that 
are most likely to be affected by the changes in the financial sectors as discussed above. 
 
13Spiegel 13/1997: 94. 
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One would assume that the tendencies towards shareholder value are strongest in big 
listed companies. Those should be overrepresented in the industrial sector, while 
companies in the service sector should be rather small and non-listed. Still the industrial 
and the financial sector had the highest wage increases in the 2000s.  
Additionally, Höpner (2003) showed the degree of shareholder value orientation 
for big German companies and found the following descending sectoral order: chemicals 
and pharmaceutics, utilities, automobile, plant and mechanical engineering, trading and 
construction. Also, here we can find that the sectors that are mostly following shareholder 
value are not the ones with the lowest wage increases. Hence, while shareholder value 
orientation surely has contributed towards the general trend, it does not seem to be the 
root cause. Looking at the regulatory reform and the changes in the behaviour and 
rhetoric in the reports of DAX 30 firms, Bradley and Sundaram (2003) dated the 
occurrence and the spread of shareholder value largely in the 1990s. For the period after 
2000 there may still be substantial effects, also due to the occurrence of new institutional 
investors, but the overall trend does rather seem to be caused by other factors, e.g. the 
labour market reforms at the beginning of the 2000s.  
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The large non-profit oriented part of the banking sector is a unique and remarkable 
feature of the German financial system. The high reliance on banks instead of markets to 
finance the German system was traditionally described as a bank based system, where 
Bundesbank, government and the banks themselves were interested in the preservation of 
the existing order. Only when the big banks‘ business model as house banks of the large 
German industrial firms eroded those actors defected and pushed for a more market based 
system, to support their new focus on investment banking. This was supported by the 
Bundesbank and the German government, which introduced a range of changes to the 
relevant laws and regulations in the 1990s and early 2000s. Most importantly, the 
environment was made more transparent and attractive to foreign investors. Additionally, 
the regulatory structure was adapted for the development of a market for corporate 
control. Likewise, tax laws were adapted allowing corporations to reduce their cross-
shareholdings without paying taxes on the capital gains. This facilitated the already 
ongoing disintegration of the German company network, where the big financial 
institutions in particular—the former core of the network—retreated due to their new 
investment banking focus.  
Examining the direct influence of the financial sector on inequality, I could not 
find similar trends as in some of the Anglo-Saxon countries. The data that was examined 
did not suggest huge increases in bankers‘ wages, nor in the profit share of that sector. 
The financial sector followed the overall trend of enormous increases in CEO pay; 
however, that trend was not unique to the financial sector, even though, the Deutsche 
Bank, with the highest payments up to the crisis, could have served as a lead example for 
other large companies. Nevertheless, further research on the wage distribution in the 
sector and regarding non-CEO leading staff of the banks would be interesting to get a 
better idea of the general trends within the financial sector.  
Next the relation between the financial and the non-financial sector was examined. 
Looking at the ownership structure of the non-financial corporate sector in Germany, it 
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was found that the replacement of strategic, relatively stable investors by largely 
financially interested investors has given rise to an increased focus on financial goals and 
the application of shareholder value oriented strategies by the management boards. 
Additionally, the reduction of strategic investors has allowed new forms of institutional 
investors to become important shareholders. Having that position, they actively try to 
change management strategies towards the (short-term) benefit of shareholders partially 
at the expense of other stakeholders.  
The change from largely strategic stable shareholders (together with the legal 
changes enacted in the 1990s and early 2000s) has given rise to a market for corporate 
control, which increases the pressure of management to follow shareholder value 
strategies to keep share prices high and not being targeted by hostile takeover attempts.  
This focus of management on shareholder value has also distributional effects. 
Giving priority to profitability and shareholder value instead of pursuing growth and a 
compromise among stakeholders may have led to increases in the profit share. Given the 
unequal distribution of wealth in Germany, this also can help to explain the more unequal 
personal income distribution. However, at least for the big companies the turn towards 
shareholder value had already started in the 1990s. While it surely has contributed 
towards the increasing inequality in the 2000s, the uniform decline of wage growth in all 
sectors lead to the conclusion that the changes in the financial structure and the 
corresponding changes in corporate governance are not the main explanation of the 
increased inequality observed in the 2000s.  
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Comments 
Your paper examines the relationship between changes in the financial sector and 
the increasing inequality in Germany over the last two decades. Apparently, the article is 
a good dissection of the national accounts and some financial sector indicators. But, I 
have a firm belief that a researcher would have to start by asking whether there is clear 
increase in income inequality and then see if it occurs around the time of a visible change 
in financial system arrangements. Without the former, there is nothing to study. Without 
the latter, one should probably be looking elsewhere. This creates a motivation to analyse 
the relationship between financial sector and income inequality in the context of 
Germany. Unfortunately, your paper could not motivate as a researchers. More clearly, 
the underline theatrical linkages between financial sector development and income 
inequality lacks in your paper.  
Then you claimed that the large non-profit oriented part of the banking sector is a 
unique and remarkable feature of the German financial system. I believe this is not true. 
Look at the banking system of China. China also has four Large state owned banks and 
doing the non-banking activities. For example, they are loaning purely for the social 
objective like poverty reduction, enhancing of the literacy rate and balla balla. But they 
are contributing in the economic growth and the reducing the income inequality through 
their non- profit making and inefficient banking system. I suggest, as a young researcher, 
you must read about the Chinese financial system as well. You will get some new 
insights from their financial arrangements.    
You took a stance that the higher employees‘ compensation in the financial sector 
is contributing in Income inequality of Germany. On the contrary your article give a feel 
that the employees compensations in financial are merely high. So, there is a mismatch 
between claims and your evidences in the paper.  
Then you claimed that the wage compensations in the financial sectors are lower 
than the financial sector in US. If the financial sector is growing in Germany, I need your 
comment here, and then the employees‘ compensation will be much higher than the 
present scenario. Are you expecting more Income inequality? If yes, then you must give 
some guide line to your policy makers 
I really must appreciate your work. Because you, as a young researcher, have done 
a lot to understand the data. This is really lacking in young researchers, specially in my 
country. Whah they usually do, they get some indices and put them in a software like 
STATA , Eviews or rats and get some favourable sign and size of the parameters. Indeed, 
this will not help them to be a influential researcher.  
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